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ABSTRACT 
Understanding religious and non-religious giving in Thailand will help us to comprehend the role of Buddhism 
on social reciprocity which is a necessary condition for policy recommendation to enhance the participatory 
development of Thai citizens. The study found that attending religious services on a regular basis does make 
people become more generous to both religious and non-religious contributions indicating the influence of 
Buddhism on socioeconomic development of Thailand. Highest educational achievement plays a major role on 
both money and time contributions. Education thus is a means not only to human capital formation but also to 
implanting the social reciprocal value to young generations. In addition, while government spending on religious 
boosts up the religious contributions, it in turn lessens the non-religious giving. But the level of an individual 
social capital significantly increases individual’s time volunteers to both religious and non-religious 
organizations. Government hence may consider diverting some of their religious spending towards community-
based social capital accumulation by financing community activities that could enhance the civic participations. 
Furthermore, policy makers should encourage people to follow news on a daily basis to make people become 
aware of social needs. The accuracy and reliability of social media thus have an indirect influence on social 
reciprocity. 
Keywords: Money and time contribution, Religious and Nonreligious giving, Social Capital, Participatory 
development 
 
1. Introduction 
According to the 2005 survey of social and cultural participations in Thailand conducted by the National 
Statistics Office, about 50 millions of Thai citizens aged 15 years and older are Buddhists accounting to 95 
percents of Thai population. Buddhism thus has a major influence on people from all walks of life in particular 
to their money and time contributions to charities.  Understanding religious and non-religious giving behaviors 
will help us to comprehend the role of Buddhism on the social reciprocity in the Thai economy which is a 
necessary condition for policy recommendations to promote private voluntary contributions so as to enhance the 
participatory development of Thai citizens. 
Study on the ‘Economics of Philanthropy’ was quite well known in most developed countries especially in the 
US where government has downsized the public sector and allowed Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
to provide public services which were financed both by private and public contributions. Charities in Thailand 
also provide a large number of public services including health and medical services, education, shelters for 
orphans and homeless elderly, environmental protection, sports programs, as well as religious services. As the 
higher education and medical services in Thailand are in the process of privatization, understanding individual 
giving and voluntary behaviors will be useful for charitable fundraising of NGOs which will play a key role on 
the economic development of Thailand in the near future. 
Most of the studies on the voluntary provision of public goods based their conceptual frameworks on the 
classical paper of Bergstrom, Bloom, and, Varian (BBV) in 1986. Applying the game theoretical model, BBV 
(1986) explained that only those whose marginal benefit from the consumption of public goods exceeds their 
marginal cost of contribution will contribute a positive amount of their wealth to the provision of public goods, 
otherwise they will free ride. Further studies like Brown and Lankford (1992), Duncan (1999), and 
Apinunmahakul and Devlin (2004) extended BBV’s model to examine the relationship between charitable giving 
and volunteering. But the basic idea remains the same that people give money (or time) to charities in order to 
increase the provision of public goods. 
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On the empirical side, studies on this issue at the early stage attempted to answer the question of whether or not 
the charitable donation should be tax exempt. Important studies like Feldstein and Taylor (1976), and Clotfelter 
(1980, and, 1985) indicated that with the tax price elasticity of giving greater than one in absolute term, while the 
income elasticity less than one implied that income tax exempt policy in US stimulated more gifts to private 
charities. More recent studies, however, focus not merely on the tax exempt issue, but on other factors that are 
likely to affect giving and voluntary simultaneously, for instance, the distinction between permanent and 
transitory income effect (Randolph, 1995), the crowding out effect of government contribution (Andreoni and 
Payne, 2003), the influence of an individual’s social networks on private philanthropy (Apinunmahakul and 
Devlin, 2008), and so on.  
This paper investigated both money and time contributions to religious and non-religious organizations in 
Thailand. It is thus the first study that examined the issue from a Buddhist setting.  The study found that 
attending religious services on a regular basis does make people more generous to both religious and non-
religious charities. Highest educational achievement also plays a major role on both money and time 
contributions. Education thus is a means not only to human capital formation but also to implanting the social 
reciprocal value to younger generations. In addition, while government spending on religious boosts up the 
religious contributions, it in turn lessens the non-religious giving. Government may consider diverting some of 
their religious spending towards community-based social capital accumulation by financing community activities 
that could enhance the civic participations. For the study found that the level of an individual social capital 
significantly increases time volunteers to both religious and non-religious organizations. Furthermore, policy 
makers should encourage people to follow news on daily basis as it makes people to become aware of social 
needs. The accuracy and reliability of social media thus have an indirect influence on social reciprocity. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the empirical model, and section three reports the 
regression results. Conclusions are then made in section four. 
2 Empirical Model 
As mentioned before, the theoretical framework of this study is based on the voluntary provision of public goods 
model first introduced by BBV (1986). Considering a utility maximizing consumer who decides how to 
allocation his money and time resources in between his own consumption and leisure, and, money or time (or 
both) contribution to the provision of public goods.  
At optimal, an individual’s decision of how much money to give and how many hours to volunteer can be 
translated into the following empirical specification. 
(1)  jjjjjjjjj soccaptemplegovtXincometaxpriceY δααααααα +++++++= 6543210                    
Yj refers to the amount of money giving or the frequency of times volunteer per month. For most of the 
respondents in the survey never recorded their hours volunteer but do recall the volunteering activities they 
participated each month. The variable ‘Taxprice’ equals to one minus the marginal tax rate whenever donation is 
tax exempt. For this study, however, the respondents were not willing to report their personal income, ‘Taxprice’ 
thus is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent filled in the amount of money donation in the income tax 
form for the income tax reduction purpose, and zero otherwise. ‘Income’ refers to the respondent’s household 
income, while ‘X’ refers to individual and household characteristics that might influence an individual demand 
for public goods, and consequently his contribution behavior. X is such as gender, marital status, highest level of 
education achievement, number of children in household, and so on.  
 ‘Govt’ refers to the per capita government spending on religious. The purpose of this variable is to examine 
whether or not government spending will cause ‘crowding out’ effect to private contribution and to compare the 
result of this study with others like Roberts (1984), Kingma (1989), and, Duncun (1999). Most of the studies in 
US found that government spending in general crowds out giving to both religious and non-religious 
organizations. As a Buddhist economy, the results here might differ from those in the US. 
Buddhist temples in Thailand may be classified broadly into two categories. Temples that were patronized by the 
royal families and those were not. Royal temples (or “Wat Luang” in Thai), in general are older and have some 
relations to the history of Thailand. Being a royal temple thus may influence an individual’s decision when come 
to choose which temple to make a contribution. In addition, a distance from one own dwelling to the nearest 
temple may become an obstacle to religious contribution. ‘Temple’ in equation (1) hence consists of two 
explanatory variables. ‘WATRANK” is a dummy variable equal to one if the temple that the respondent made 
his contributions is a royal temple, zero otherwise. “WATDISTANCE” is a distance in kilometer from the 
dwelling of the respondent to the nearest temple.  
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Furthermore, this study also include a host of social capital variables ( ‘soccap’ in equation 1) to analyze whether 
the level of an individual social capital has any influence on the individual’s voluntary behavior, and whether the 
effect on the religious organizations differs from those of their non-religious counterpart. Social capital in this 
study made up of number of years in community (YRSCOMMU), number of clubs or associations that the 
respondent being members (CLUB), voting participation at the local (LOCALVOTE) and national 
(NATIONALVOTE) levels, whether the respondent following news regularly (DLYNEWS), and the frequency 
of times spent with one own family (FAMILY), relatives (RELATIVES), and neighbors (NEIGHBOR). 
Furthermore, the study also include a religious networks of an individual by asking whether the person attend the 
religious service on a monthly (MONTHWAT) or yearly (YEARWAT) basis, and whether the respondent does 
any devotional activity himself on monthly (MONTHDEVOTE) or yearly (YEARDEVOTE) basis. Details of all 
variables used in the regression analysis and their descriptive statistics are presented in the next section. 
Notice that the two demand functions of giving are observable only when the amount of money donation or the 
frequency of times volunteer per month is greater than zero. Bivariate Tobit (BiTobit) thus is a suitable 
regression specification to estimate these two giving equations simultaneously, and then test the hypothesis 
whether the covariance across the two equations (the random error terms, δ in giving and volunteering 
specifications) is non-zero (Greene, 2000). 
3. The Results 
Data used in this study is a primary surveyed data which is a part of a research study on ‘Economic of Religious’ 
funded by the National Research Council of Thailand in 2011 to a research team at the National Institute of 
Development Administration (NIDA) to explore the impact of Buddhism on the Thai economy.  Although the 
sample consists of 2,671 observations, after excluding those who do not answer the questions interested in this 
study, 2,557 observations were left for analysis. 
Table 1 summarized the descriptive statistics of the sample. The explanatory variables were categorized into 
three categories of personal and household characteristics, the level of an individual social capital, the 
characteristics of Buddhist temples and government policies, respectively. 
From table 1, there were more females (59 percent) than males (41 percents) in the sample. Most of the 
respondents (65 percents) were married and still live with their spouse.  The average respondent is 46 years old 
living in a household with 4 persons but has less than one child (aged 18 years and below) per family. The data 
thus is consistent with the demographic structure of Thailand which has become older.  
Most of the respondents lived in rural area (60 percent). 46 percent of the sample resides in a large province with 
populations over a million.  37 percent of the sample has less than primary education. An average household 
earned 24,041 Thai Baht a month but a wide range of the standard deviation reflects the disparity in income 
distribution.  
This study used times spent with family and friends, as well as participations in civic activities as proxies for the 
level of an individual social capital. From Table 1, 41 percent of the sample spent time with their family for at 
least once a month. Half of the sample reported that they met with their relatives few times a year. 58 percent of 
the sample had their own house, and on average, lived in the community for 32 years. About one-fourth of the 
sample participated in the community activities every month, while about two-third participated few times a 
year. However, majority of people followed news daily (88 percent), voted in both the local (88 percent), and 
national (87 percent) elections.  
For the religious based social capital, 52 percent of the sample attended the religious service (not a funeral or a 
religious ceremony) for at least once a month. And 59 percent reported that they had self-devotion at home either 
by prayers, meditations, studying religious materials themselves, and/or watching religious programs. 
In 2011, Thai government spent 3,878.5 million Thai Baht on religious activities equivalent to 43.57 Baht per 
person. In addition, the number of population per monk of each province was included to examine the influence 
of religious on individual voluntary behavior in particular on the religious contribution. The survey found an 
approximate of 247 people per monk.  
In general, people prefer to contribute money more than time. The average respondent gave more than twice to 
the religious organizations (2,885 Baht a year) than to the non-religious organizations (1,112 Baht a year), but 
the total amount of giving was merely 1.4 percent of household income ({2,885+1,112}/{24,041 x 12}). Only 
1.3 percent of the sample applied their money donation for the income tax reduction purpose. The respondent on 
average volunteered for both religious and non-religious charities few times a year.  
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Table 2 presents the regression results of the Bivariate Tobit model. Notice that those who were married and still 
lived with their spouse make more donation than those with other marital status like single, widows, or divorce. 
A married donor gives 490 Baht (2885*0.17) more to the religious organizations and donates another 322.5 Baht 
more (1112*0.29) to the non-religious organization as compared to those with other marital status.  Household 
income is an important factor that determines giving. The study found that money donation is a normal good for 
Thai citizens. As household income increases by one percent, the amount of giving to religious and non-religious 
organization increases by 0.24% and 0.32% respectively. The results are consistent with the assumption made in 
BBV (1986) and the empirical findings of Feldstein and Taylor (1976), and Clotfelter (1980, 1985). 
Highest education achievement is another important determinant of voluntary contribution. For the religious 
contribution, those with the lower secondary education give 0.32% more than those with no education, while 
those with higher education and upper secondary give 0.30% and 0.26% respectively more than those with no 
education. For the non-religious contribution, the amount of giving increases with the level of education. For 
people with upper secondary, diploma, and bachelor degree (or higher) give 0.56%, 0.60%, and 0.73% 
respectively more than those with no education.  Higher education may help people to become more aware of 
social problems, thus is willing to help out those in needs. Education hence is a tool to establish a mindset of 
social awareness to younger generations. 
Almost all social capital variables are statistically significant in explaining volunteering behaviors to both the 
religious and non-religious organizations. Social capital thus can be a means to support participatory 
development of general public. 
Attending religious service once a month also makes people become generous. Those who attend the religious 
service monthly contribute money and time to religious organizations 0.39% and 0.76% respectively more than 
those who do not attend the religious service on monthly basis. They also contribute more money (0.27%) and 
more time (0.51%) to the non-religious organizations than those who do not attend the religious service on 
monthly basis. 
Following news also help people to be more aware of social needs. Those who follow news daily contribute 
more time to both the religious (0.32%) and non-religious (0.59%) organizations than their counterpart who did 
not follow news. 
Government spending on religious causes both crowding-in and crowding-out effects. As government spending 
increases by 1%, money contribution to religious charities increases by 0.58% but to the non-religious charities 
declines by 1.3%. Nonetheless, the tax-price of giving does not have any influence on giving in Thailand. This 
may due to the fact that very few people applied their money donations for the income tax reduction. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Buddhism is the national religious of Thailand since there was the country. The philosophy and teaching of 
Buddhism thus have a significant influence on the ways of life of people in this country particularly on their 
voluntary contribution. Understanding religious and non-religious giving in Thailand will help us to comprehend 
the role of Buddhism on the social reciprocity in the country which is a necessary condition for any policy 
recommendation to promote private voluntary contributions so as to enhance the participatory development of 
Thai citizens. 
The study found that attending religious services on a regular basis does make people become more generous to 
both religious and non-religious charities. Highest educational achievement also plays a major role on both 
money and time contributions. Education thus is a means not only to human capital formation but also to 
implanting the social reciprocal value to younger generations. In addition, while government spending on 
religious boosts up the religious contributions, it in turn lessens the non-religious giving. Government may 
consider diverting some of their religious spending towards community-based social capital accumulation by 
financing community activities that could enhance the civic participations. For the study found that the level of 
an individual social capital significantly increases time volunteers to both religious and non-religious 
organizations. Furthermore, policy makers should encourage people to follow news on daily basis as it makes 
people to become aware of social needs. The accuracy and reliability of social media thus have an indirect 
influence on social reciprocity. 
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Table 1: Data Descriptive 
(a) Individual and household characteristics 
Variable Description Mean SD 
- MARRIED    
 
- MALE       
- HHINC      
- AGE        
- NOEDUC 
 
- PRIMARY    
- SECONDAR   
 
- POSTSEC    
 
- DIPLOMA    
- HIGHEDUC  
- HHMEM      
- CHILD18    
- URBAN 
- CITY 
 
- BKK 
Dummy variable equals to 1 if married and live with spouse 0 
otherwise. 
Dummy variable equals 1 if male 0 otherwise 
Household income (Baht per month) (in natural log) 
Respondent’s age 
Dummy variable equals 1 if has no or less than primary education 
0 otherwise (reference group) 
Dummy variable equals 1 if has primary education 0 otherwise  
Dummy variable equals 1 if has lower secondary education 0 
otherwise  
Dummy variable equals 1 if has post secondary education 0 
otherwise  
Dummy variable equals 1 if has a diploma degree 0 otherwise  
Dummy variable equals 1 if has a higher education 0 otherwise  
Household members 
Number of children less than 18 years old in household 
Dummy variable equals 1 if living in urban area 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable equals 1 if living in the city with more than 1 
million populations 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable equals 1 if living in Bangkok 0 otherwise 
(reference group) 
0.6504 
 
0.4138    
24,041 
45.5870      
0.3723 
 
0.1103 
0.1400      
 
0.1787      
 
0.0512   
0.1474 
4.181      
0.8314      
0.4013      
0.4603      
 
0.0696 
0.4769 
 
0.4926 
19,933 
17.3860  
0.4835  
 
0.3133 
0.3471      
 
0.3832      
 
0.2205      
0.3546 
1.7708      
0.9883      
0.4902      
0.4985      
 
0.2545 
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- NORTH 
 
Dummy variable equals 1 if living in the northern region 0 otherwise 0.1834 
 
0.3871 
 
- CENTRAL 
 
- NORTHEAST 
 
- SOUTH 
 
Dummy variable equals 1 if living in the central region 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable equals 1 if living in the northeast region 0 
otherwise. 
Dummy variable equals 1 if living in the southern region 0 
otherwise. 
0.3387 
 
0,2104 
 
0.1979 
 
0.4734 
 
0.4077 
 
0.3985 
 
(b) Level of individual social capital 
- YRSCOMMU 
- OWNHOUSE 
-  CLUB 
- LOCALVOTE 
 
- NATIONVOTE 
 
- DLYNEWS 
-REG_NEIGHBOR 
 
 -SEL_NEIGHBOR 
 
- NO_NEIGHBOR 
 
- REG_RELATIVE 
 
- SEL_RELATIVE 
 
- NO_RELATIVE 
Years in community 
Dummy variable equals 1 if respondent owns the house 0 otherwise 
Numbers of memberships in clubs or associations. 
Dummy variable equals 1 if vote in the local election regularly 0 
otherwise. 
Dummy variable equals 1 if vote in the national election regularly 0 
otherwise. 
Dummy variable equals 1 if follows news daily 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable equals 1 if have activity with neighbor once a 
month 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable equals 1 if have activity with neighbor few times a 
year 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable equals 1 if have no activity with neighbor 0 
otherwise. (reference group) 
Dummy variable equals 1 if meet relatives once a month 0 
otherwise. 
Dummy variable equals 1 if meet relatives few times a year 0 
otherwise 
Dummy variable equals 1 if never meet with relative in the past year 
0 otherwise. (reference group) 
32.1987      
0.5831      
0.2566      
0.8811      
 
0.8713 
 
0.8842 
0.2382 
 
0.6652 
 
0.0966 
 
0.3047 
 
0.4963 
 
0.1991 
20.6779      
0.4931    
0.5940      
0.3237      
 
0.3349 
 
0.3200 
0.4260 
 
0.4720 
 
0.2955 
 
0.4604   
 
0.5000 
 
0.3994  
- REG_FAMILY 
 
- SEL_FAMILY 
 
- NO_FAMILY 
 
MONTHDEVOTE 
 
- YEARDEVOTE 
 
- NODEVOTE 
 
- MONTHWAT 
 
- YEARWAT 
 
- NOWAT 
Dummy variable equals 1 if do activity with family once a month 0 
otherwise. 
Dummy variable equals 1 if do activity with family few times a year 
0 otherwise 
Dummy variable equals 1 if never do activity with family in the past 
year 0 otherwise. (reference group) 
Dummy variable equals 1 if do self-devotion once a month 0 
otherwise. 
Dummy variable equals 1 if do self-devotion few times a year 0 
otherwise 
Dummy variable equals 1 if never do self-devotion in the past year 0 
otherwise. (reference group) 
Dummy variable equals 1 if attend religious service once a month 0 
otherwise. 
Dummy variable equals 1 if attend religious service few times a year 
0 otherwise 
Dummy variable equals 1 if never attend religious service in the past 
year 0 otherwise. (reference group) 
0.4102 
 
0.3121 
 
0.2777 
 
0.5897 
 
0.0790 
 
0.3312 
 
0.5190 
 
0.3011 
 
0.3989 
0.4920 
 
0.4634 
 
0.4479 
 
0.4920 
 
0.2698 
 
0.4708 
 
0.4997 
 
0.4588 
 
0.4898 
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 (c) Characteristics of Buddhist temples and government policy 
- WATRANK 
 
WATDISTANCE 
- LNGOVT 
 
- LNMONK 
 
- TAXREFUND 
 
WATCASH 
- NONWATCASH 
- WATVOLUNTEER 
 
 
 
 
 
NONWATVOLUNTEER 
 
 
 
 
Dummy variable equals 1 if royal patronized 
temple, 0 otherwise 
Distance from home to nearest temple (in 
kilometers) 
Government spending on religious per capita  (by 
province) (in natural log) 
Number of population per monk (by province) (in 
natural log) 
Dummy variable equals 1 if respondent apply 
money donation for income tax reduction 0 
otherwise. 
Amount of money giving to Buddhist 
organizations. 
Amount of money giving to non-religious 
organizations 
Frequency of time volunteer to Buddhist 
organizations ranging from 1-7, in which 7 refers 
to daily, 6 refers to weekly, 5 refers to few times a 
month, 4 refers to once a month,  3 refers to few 
times a year, 2 refers once a year, 1 refers to never 
do volunteer. 
 
Frequency of time volunteer to non-religious 
organizations  ranging from 1-7, in which 7 refers 
to daily, 6 refers to weekly, 5 refers to few times a 
month, 4 refers to once a month,  3 refers to few 
times a year, 2 refers once a year, 1 refers to never 
do volunteer. 
0.0301 
 
0.8608 
3.4858 
 
5.4362 
 
0.0133 
 
2,884.49 
1,112.07 
2.1533 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4286 
0.1709 
 
1.2746 
0.4038 
 
0.3393 
 
0.1147 
 
10,331.40 
2,425.89 
2.4094 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2535 
 
Table 2: Bivariate Tobit results of money and time contribution to religious and non-religious organizations. 
(a) Individual and household characteristics 
Variables Money 
contribute to 
Religious 
Z-Stat Time 
Contribute to 
Religious 
Z-Stat Money 
Contribute 
to Non-
Religious 
Z-Stat Time 
Contribute 
to Non-
Religious 
Z-Stat 
Constant 
MARRIED    
MALE       
LNHHINC      
LNAGE        
PRIMARY    
SECONDAR   
POSTSEC    
DIPLOMA    
HIGHEDUC   
HHMEM      
CHILD18    
URBAN 
CITY 
0.1242 
0.1742** 
0.0180 
0.2442** 
0.6584** 
0.2001** 
0.3235** 
0.2579** 
0.1784 
0.2964** 
-0.0135 
-0.0186 
-0.0684 
0.0496 
0.1550 
2.7680 
0.3330 
6.1980 
6.5580 
1.8010 
3.2690 
2.6560 
1.5630 
3.1980 
-0.6510 
-0.5500 
-1.1830 
0.8590 
-2.1910** 
0.1568** 
0.0840 
0.0698 
0.2114** 
-0.0798 
0.0000 
-0.0954 
-0.2082 
-0.0986 
0.0222 
0.0220 
-0.1926** 
0.2847** 
-2.3370 
2.2610 
1.4100 
1.5210 
1.9600 
-0.7300 
0.0000 
-0.9520 
-1.4230 
-0.9090 
1.0190 
0.5890 
-2.9210 
4.2820 
10.7627** 
0.2874** 
-0.1820* 
0.3211** 
0.4058** 
0.2436 
0.2782 
0.5633** 
0.6047** 
0.7339** 
0.0032 
0.1051 
0.2233* 
0.0899 
6.1170 
2.3790 
-1.7050 
4.1400 
2.1300 
1.3470 
1.5210 
3.1100 
2.1640 
3.5650 
0.0790 
1.5170 
1.9530 
0.6840 
-6.5467** 
-0.0633 
-0.0715 
0.0229 
-0.0695 
0.2377 
0.2494 
0.6646** 
0.3851* 
0.5172** 
0.0816** 
-0.0531 
-0.2439** 
0.1350 
-4.2660 
-0.5900 
-0.7850 
0.3400 
-0.4110 
1.4700 
1.5610 
4.0320 
1.6740 
3.1280 
2.3950 
-0.9690 
-2.4230 
1.4410 
Note: ** 95% level of significance; * 90% level of significance. 
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(b) Level of individual social capital 
Variables Money 
contribute 
to Religious 
Z-Stat Time 
Contribute to 
Religious 
Z-Stat Money 
Contribute 
to Non-
Religious 
Z-Stat Time 
Contribute 
to Non-
Religious 
Z-Stat 
YRSCOMMU 
OWNHOUSE 
CLUB 
LOCALVOTE 
NATIONVOTE 
DLYNEWS 
REG_NEIGHBOR 
SEL_NEIGHBOR 
REG_RELATIVE 
SEL_RELATIVE 
REG_FAMILY 
SEL_FAMILY  
MONTHDEVOTE 
YEARDEVOTE 
MONTHWAT 
YEARWAT  
0.0043** 
0.1995** 
0.2260** 
0.1754 
0.3483** 
0.0167 
0.0769 
-0.1660** 
0.1372 
0.0086 
0.1686** 
0.2999** 
0.1194* 
-0.0291 
0.3917** 
0.3051** 
2.5220 
3.2440 
5.4640 
1.1930 
2.2660 
0.1900 
0.8090 
-2.0850 
1.5240 
0.1050 
1.9610 
3.7230 
1.7430 
-0.2170 
5.1220 
4.0970 
0.0023 
0.1228* 
0.2559** 
-0.1156 
0.3614* 
0.3219** 
0.2471** 
0.4938** 
0.1780* 
0.2225** 
0.5205** 
0.1526* 
0.0609 
-0.1004 
0.7583** 
0.2628** 
1.2270 
1.8060 
5.5240 
-0.5900 
1.9030 
3.3760 
2.0590 
4.3510 
1.7820 
2.4390 
5.3600 
1.7920 
0.8230 
-0.7800 
7.7270 
2.8630 
0.0058* 
-0.0101 
0.4787** 
0.1925 
0.2011 
0.0518 
0.1510 
-0.2423 
0.5338** 
0.1858 
0.0932 
0.2668* 
0.1014 
-0.0887 
0.2734* 
0.2166 
1.8740 
-0.0810 
4.0060 
0.6080 
0.6440 
0.3280 
0.7750 
-1.4050 
2.8690 
1.1660 
0.5380 
1.7270 
0.8190 
-0.3790 
1.8540 
1.4160 
0.0042 
0.1488 
0.6022** 
-0.3105 
0.5516* 
0.5932** 
0.3155* 
0.2482 
0.4020** 
-0.0073 
0.3312** 
0.2271* 
-0.0491 
0.4017* 
0.5125** 
0.0850 
1.4700 
1.4460 
9.4310 
-1.0010 
1.8310 
3.7270 
1.6470 
1.4240 
2.5670 
-0.0530 
2.3260 
1.6920 
-0.4360 
1.9680 
3.7190 
0.5960 
Note: ** 95% level of significance; * 90% level of significance. 
 
(c) Characteristics of Buddhist temples and government policy 
Variables Money 
contribute 
to 
Religious 
Z-Stat Time 
Contribute 
to Religious 
Z-Stat Money 
Contribute 
to Non-
Religious 
Z-Stat Time 
Contribute 
to Non-
Religious 
Z-Stat 
WATRANK 
WATDISTANCE 
LNGOVT 
LNMONK 
TAXREFUND  
-0.0619 
-0.0195 
0.5837** 
0.1176 
0.3660 
-0.3430 
-0.7770 
7.1470 
1.2420 
1.5630 
0.0127 
-0.0249 
-0.1368 
-0.0293 
0.0460 
0.0730 
-1.0840 
-1.4150 
-0.2620 
0.1600 
0.0329 
0.0097 
-1.3145** 
-0.8353** 
0.3334 
0.1090 
0.1740 
-8.6590 
-3.4370 
0.7120 
0.8206 
-0.0292 
0.6724** 
0.2407 
0.6172 
2.5930 
-0.7480 
4.1360 
1.4850 
1.4330 
Rho(DonationWat, VolunteerWat) 0.1653** 6.489 Number of observations  2557 
Log likelihood function  -7260.066 
Iterations completed 79 
Rho(DonationNonwat, VolunteerNonwat) 0.2794** 10.893 Number of observations  2557 
Log likelihood function  -8176.895 
Iterations completed 80 
Note: ** 95% level of significance; * 90% level of significance. 
 
 
 
